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THE REJECTED THREAT OF CORPORATE
VOTE SUPPRESSION: THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE ANTI-ACTIVIST PILL
Jeffrey N. Gordon*
As disciplinary takeovers are replaced by activist
shareholder campaigns, managements may well want to turn
to the “anti-activist pill” as shelter from the storm. The
economic shock from the widespread shutdown to combat the
Covid-19 pandemic produced dozens of so-called “crisis pills.”
The defense of these pills as avoiding “disruption” and
“distraction” of managements can be seen as a test run for
broader use of poison pills to fend off shareholder activism. The
Delaware courts, first Chancery and then the Supreme Court,
rejected this managerial defense tactic in a way that clarifies
the role of the poison pill in corporate governance. In the
context of a hostile tender offer, the pill may be legitimated as
protecting the statutory “two-step” for a merger: first, screening
and negotiating by the board, followed by a shareholder vote
on a proposed merger. Delaware’s board-centric model relies
on another statutory mechanism—a director election contest—
as the appropriate avenue for managerial accountability.
Various elements of the poison pill—the cap on share
ownership and a definition of “beneficial owner” that goes
beyond “record owner”—have unfortunate side effects on
election contests but are necessary to prevent unvetted shifts in
*

Richard Paul Richman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Codirector of the Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate
Ownership; Co-director of the Richman Center for Business, Law and Public
Policy. I appreciate discussions with my friends and colleagues about these
issues, even (and especially) when we disagree, including Jack Coffee, Ron
Gilson, Zohar Goshen, Josh Mitts, Ed Rock, and Leo Strine. The research
help of Luke Porcari, CLS ‘22, was invaluable. Parts of the analysis first
appeared in the Columbia Blue Sky Blog. Many thanks to Reynolds Holding
for skillful editing and to Eric Robinson for deeply informed objection and
debate.
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control via tender offer or the gradual accumulation of stock (a
“creeping tender offer”) either directly or with confederates. An
anti-activist pill converts these side effects into its very
mechanism, precisely to block a successful director election
contest. An election contest is different from a tender offer in
this critical respect: Success requires persuasion of a
shareholder majority who will remain shareholders after the
event. A low pill trigger reduces the activist’s economic
incentives and can reduce its credibility; a capacious definition
of beneficial ownership burdens its task of persuasion. The
Delaware Courts’ reaffirmation of the legitimating role of the
shareholder franchise is particularly important now, as the set
of shareholder activists expands to include ESG activists who
will use director election contests to propose broader
conceptions of corporate purpose and shareholder value
pursuit.
I. Introduction ..................................................................... 207
II. Shareholder Empowerment, but to What End(s)? ........ 209
III. The Williams Companies Case ..................................... 215
IV. The Pill: Origins and the Anti-Activist Renegade ........ 223
V. The Renegade Theory of the Anti-Activist Pill .............. 228
VI. Activism as “Mistargeting” ........................................... 234
VII. Conclusion.................................................................... 245

I. INTRODUCTION
The Covid-19 Crisis of 2020 precipitated adoption of
“poison pills” by dozens of public companies on the ground that
the sudden stock price drops that resulted from the
pandemic’s economic turbulence would draw hostile takeover
bids and a surge of opportunistic activism.1 These fears proved
unfounded and, in general, these “crisis pills”— most of which
had a one-year term2—expired in due course. Nevertheless,
1 The moment is comprehensively described by Ofer Eldar & Michael
D. Wittry, Crisis Poison Pills, 10 Rev. CORP. FIN. STUD. 204 (2021).
2 Id. at 208 (finding that seventy-three percent of poison pills adopted
during COVID-19 sunset after one year).
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these pills came to be seen as testing out new theories of
managerial prerogative and new technologies of pill
expansion. In particular, these pills seemed principally aimed
not against a possible hostile bidder (the pill’s original
justification) but rather against shareholder activists who
might challenge management’s strategic or operational
acumen—otherwise known as anti-activist pills. And at least
some of the pills employed a very low ownership percentage
trigger3 and a capacious definition of “beneficial ownership”
designed to disable an activist’s capacity to build a
shareholder consensus in favor of the activist’s position.4
As this Article develops, the Delaware courts have rejected,
at least for now, this effort to insulate management from
shareholder challenge. But the stakes are not just
management versus hostile bidders or hostile hedge funds.
“Shareholder activism” is beginning to attract new players—
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activists who
may contend for a different conception of shareholder value.
Like the hedge fund activists, these new activists may
explicitly challenge the company’s preexisting business plan;
management may well want to disrupt their activities as well.
Because the pill operates by impeding the core mechanism of
corporate governance—shareholder voting— an “anti-activist
pill” is a barrier to all varieties of shareholder activism.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses
“shareholder empowerment.” Part III describes In re Williams
Companies Stockholder Litigation5 and how it may mark the
end of the anti-activist poison pill. Parts IV and V describe the
origins of the poison pill and why the anti-activist pill is

3 Id. at 208 (finding pills in the sample had, on average, a twelve
percent trigger compared to the historical conventional trigger of twenty
percent). A more detailed examination of the authors’ data reveals that pills
that include “acting in concert” provisions, approximately a third (seven of
twenty), have triggers of five percent or less.
4 See id. (finding that many, though a minority, of “[t]hese pills . . . have
provisions that specifically target activist investors acting in concert”).
5 No. 2020-0707-KSJM, 2021 WL 754593 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021
(McCormick, C.), aff’d sub nom. Williams Cos. v. Wolosky, 264 A.3d 641
(Del. Nov. 3, 2021) (unpublished table disposition) (mem.).
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properly regarded as a renegade. Part VI responds to a novel
defense of the anti-activist pill recently offered by Zohar
Goshen and Reilly Steel on the grounds that activists’
“mistargeting” may result in substantial losses of shareholder
value and social wealth.6 Activists, they say, are probably
worse in this regard than hostile bidders, “raiders.” Part VII
concludes.

II. SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT, BUT TO
WHAT END(S)?
These are boom times for shareholder empowerment in the
large public corporation. While the core statutory feature of
shareholder empowerment, shareholder voting for directors,
has remained unchanged, the formal and informal avenues
have multiplied over the past decades. Among the formal
routes are annual say-on-pay-votes7; majority (as opposed to
plurality) voting rules for directors8; expansion of proxy access
Zohar Goshen & Reilly Steel, Raiders, Activists, and the Risk of
Mistargeting,
132
YALE
L.
J.
(forthcoming
2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3945764 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
7 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) requires periodic non-binding shareholder votes on
executive compensation. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2018). In addition to its effect on
shaping executive compensation, the annual votes may also reflect
shareholder (dis)satisfaction with managerial performance. See Jill Fisch,
Darius Palia & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The
Impact of Firm Performance, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 103 (2018); Randall
S. Thomas, Alan R. Palmiter & James F. Cotter, Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay:
Will It Lead to a Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1222 (2012).
8 Majority voting matters primarily in the context of uncontested
elections. Under the traditional plurality voting rule, a single vote could be
sufficient to elect a director in an uncontested election. Shareholder
proponents led a movement towards majority voting which has been largely
successful over the past two decades. Stephen J. Choi et al., Does Majority
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1125–27,
1147 (2016) (explaining that early adopters of majority voting already
tended to be shareholder-friendly, but that the shift to majority voting by
later adopting firms “led to more shareholder-friendly governance.”); see
6
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under Delaware law9; and, most recently, the adoption of
“universal” proxy cards that will provide choice among all
director nominees in a contested election.10 These formal
empowerment measures provide transmission conduits for
the shareholder power that is inherent in the
contemporaneous reconcentration of share ownership into the
hands of institutional investors.11 Before this institutional
reconcentration, the principal and perhaps only effective
mechanism for collective shareholder action was the tender
offer, which achieved reconcentration through a radical
change in the ownership of the firm. Shareholder power came
from owning it all. Institutional reconcentration, which
dramatically reduces the collective action costs of concerted
shareholder engagement, opens many more routes for the
expression of shareholder power while unlocking a diverse
menu of shareholder objectives.

also Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Does the Director
Election System Matter? Evidence from Majority Voting, 20 REV. ACCT.
STUD. 1, 4 (2015) (finding abnormal positive returns around annual
meetings taking up shareholder proposals to adopt majority voting).
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2021). Proxy access was expanded in
Delaware in 2009. 77 Del. Laws 19 (2009). Section 113 also provides for
expense reimbursement for proxy contests, as specified in a company’s bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (2021).
10 In November 2021, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
adopted new rules “requiring parties in a contested election to use universal
proxy cards that include all director nominees presented for election at a
shareholder meeting.” Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts New Rules for
Universal Proxy Cards in Contested Director Elections (Nov. 1, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-235 [https://perma.cc/K29MZEKR]; see Universal Proxy, Exchange Act Release No. 93,596, Investment
Company Act Release No. 34,419, 86 Fed. Reg. 68,330 (Dec. 1, 2021) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240), This is a marked shift from the prior regime
under which a proxy contestant had to circulate its own card. See generally
Scott Hirst, Universal Proxies, 35 YALE J. REG. 437 (2018) (discussing the
prior regime and the universal proxy alternative).
11 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of
Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance
Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 864–88 (2013) (discussing the history
behind this governance change and its consequence).
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So, shareholder empowerment, yes—but to what end?
Spurred by “gadflies”12 and various other governance
entrepreneurs,13 we have seen waves of governance
activism,14 designed to enhance board and managerial
accountability. There have also been waves of “performance
activism,” led principally by a specialized group of investment
companies, styled as “hedge funds,” which have focused on the
economic performance of public companies.15 More recently
we have seen what might be the rise of “ESG activism,”
focusing specifically on climate change and opening the way
to address other matters on the ESG agenda.16
Certainly, the most salient use of shareholder power has
been towards the goal of increasing shareholder value. The
case for governance activism is commonly framed in terms of
its association with increases in various measures of

12 Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies,
94 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 569 (2021).
13 E.g.,
SHAREHOLDER
RIGHTS
PROJECT,
http://www.srp.law.harvard.edu/index.shtml
[https://perma.cc/MHY6SCRB] (last visited May 16. 2022) (focusing on declassifying boards); Lucian
Bebchuk, Scott Hirst & June Rhee, Towards the Declassification of S&P 500
Boards, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 157 (2013) (focusing on the same).
14 SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2021 U.S.
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND ACTIVIST SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS 11 (2022),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/sc-publication-review-analysis2021-US-shareholder-activism.pdf [https://perma.cc/76CZ-8X46] (reporting
a twenty-eight percent increase in shareholder activism campaigns in 2021
from 2020).
15 See LAZARD, Q1 2022 REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM (2022),
https://www.lazard.com/media/452060/lazards-q1-2022-review-ofshareholder-activism-vff.pdf [https://perma.cc/T83N-78A6] (showing hedge
fund activist waves over the 2019-2022 period).
16 RICHARD J. GROSSMAN, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM
LLC,
ACTIVISM
LANDSCAPE
CONTINUES
TO
EVOLVE
(2021),
https://www.skadden.com/-/media/files/publications/2022/01/2022insights/activism_landscape_continues_to_evolve.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5B8-KXS9] (predicting an uptick in ESG activism
campaigns); see also supra notes 75–76 (discussing ESG activism regarding
ExxonMobil).
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shareholder value.17 So is the case for performance activism.18
In fostering better control of “managerial agency costs,”
governance and performance activism purports to deliver
value for the shareholders. A contentious battle has raged
over whether performance activists have pursued short-term
shareholder value maximization at the expense of long-term
value maximization.19 A different sort of objection is that this
sort of shareholder activism is misguided: that such
shareholder interventions based on incomplete information
are likely to disrupt managers’ pursuit of shareholder value
maximization.20
The most recent turn in the debate is that at least a
significant fraction of shareholders may not want managers to
pursue shareholder value maximization. The most radical
perspective is that shareholders prefer that managers take
stakeholder interests into account, a balance that takes
seriously shareholders’ non-pecuniary pro-social interests.21
17 For the claim that collections of better governance terms may
increase value, see Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate
Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON. 107, 108–09 (2003); cf.
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009) (presenting evidence, without
concluding, “that entrenching provisions bring about or help maintain lower
firm valuation”).
18 E.g., Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance,
and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (“We find that the
market reacts favorably to activism, consistent with the view that it creates
value.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects
of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1087, 1154 (2015)
(finding no support for the “myopic-activists” claim that activist hedgefunds negatively affect long-term firm value). But see Martijn Cremers,
Saura Masconale & Simone Sepe, Activist Hedge Funds and the
Corporation, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2016) (arguing that hedge-fund
activism negatively affect long-term firm value).
19 These arguments are canvassed in MARK J. ROE, MISSING THE
TARGET: WHY STOCK-MARKET SHORT-TERMISM IS NOT THE PROBLEM (2022).
20 Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for
Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 770–72 (2017);
Goshen & Steel, supra note 6 (manuscript at 3).
21 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize
Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247, 250–51, 271
(2017); Eleonora Broccardo, Oliver D. Hart & Luigi Zingales, Exit v. Voice
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An intermediate perspective is that shareholders’ conception
of “shareholder value” would exclude gains that derive from
the imposition of externalities, for example, pollution that is
not unlawful under applicable law but that might give rise to
tort liability if exposed.22 Yet a different perspective drives
from “stewardship activism,” which would constrain own-firm
shareholder value maximization in favor of portfolio value
maximization.23 This perspective would minimize the firm’s
contribution to systematic costs and risks, most notably
associated with financial stability and climate change.24
The issue is simply one of power: whether shareholders
should have the power to influence, perhaps even change, the
management of the firm, and further, even to modify the
objective function of firm within a framework that
acknowledges the essentially economic mission of the firm.
Core organizational law—the statutory framework that
provides the basis for the corporation’s existence and specifies
its internal governance—channels control over the
corporation’s decision-making and action through the board.25
Agents of the corporation act through power delegated by the
board.26 The statutory framework also specifies a process of
director succession, namely annual elections.27 Unless
otherwise specified in the company’s charter, the

38 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. w27710, 2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3679703 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
22 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systematic Stewardship, J. CORP. L.
(forthcoming
2022)
(manuscript
at
51),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3782814 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review); cf. Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate
Disobedience, 68 DUKE L. J. 709, 711 (2019) (arguing that corporations have
a duty to obey the law even at the expense of shareholder value).
23 See Gordon, supra note 22 (manuscript at 5).
24 See id. (manuscript at 3, 9).
25 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2021).
26 Id. § 142.
27 Id. §§ 141(d), 211(b).
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shareholders’ initiative and plebiscitary authority are quite
limited under the prevailing Delaware law.28
This means that fundamental disagreements about the
corporation’s performance and conduct are necessarily
channeled through election contests over composition of the
board. Given the set up, there is no other way. This means
proxy contests, including a credible threat of a proxy contest,
in which groups of shareholders may take opposing positions
under a majority rule system. A tender offer may offer an
alternative since tendering shares in effect replaces the vote;
but to insist in effect on an unanimity rule effectuated through
an “any and all” tender offer would be an extraordinary
change to our present set up.29 Whatever the feasibility of
insisting on such an approach by performance activists, it
would rule out interventions by ESG activists.
Thus, it is now clear why the Delaware Supreme Court’s
affirmance30 of the Chancery Court’s invalidation of an antiactivist pill in In re Williams Companies Stockholder
Litigation31 is such an important moment in shaping the
corporate governance environment. Chancellor McCormick’s
trenchant opinion stands for the proposition that any pill
designed to forestall an election contest will necessarily fail
the applicable tests.32 This is because the risk that
shareholders “would vote erroneously out of ignorance or
28 CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238–39 (Del.
2008) (holding that a shareholder-adopted bylaw requiring pill redemption
is invalid because of conflict with section 141(a), the board’s power to
manage); Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1194 (Del.
2010) (finding a presumption in favor of charter over bylaw, amendable by
shareholders, in a case of ambiguity).
29 Delaware law is likely to regard a partial bid for a fifty-one percent
majority as structurally coercive because the price offered to the tendering
fifty-one percent will be at a market premium. This means that the target
board can engage in preclusive defensive measures. See Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
30 Williams Cos. v. Wolosky, 264 A.3d 641 (Del. Nov. 3, 2021)
(unpublished table disposition) (mem.).
31 In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., No. 2020-0707-KSJM, 2021 WL
754593 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021 (McCormick, C.).
32 See id.
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mistaken belief” is not a cognizable “threat” that would justify
such an inhibitory action.33 As a result, a pill is permissible
only for its previously-established use—to block a unilateral
control shift, either through a public tender offer or through
gradual accumulation of shares through open market
purchases, a “creeping” tender offer.

III. THE WILLIAMS COMPANIES CASE
At the outset of the Covid-19 crisis, The Williams
Companies adopted a “stockholder rights plan” designed to
forestall an activist challenge to management’s running of the
company during a period of economic uncertainty.34 The pill
contained two far-reaching elements. The first was a fivepercent ownership trigger.35 A party reaching that threshold
would face an immediate dilution of its equity interest
through a “flip-in” provision36 and, in the event of a follow-up
merger, would face further dilution through a “flip-over”
provision.37 The second element was a sweeping definition of
“acting in concert” for the purposes of determining “beneficial
ownership.”38 The definition included acting “in parallel” or
simply acting “towards a common goal” as pertains not just to
“changing” but also “influencing control of the Company.”39
The “acting in concert” concept was further broadened to
include “daisy chain” connections: parties who were acting in
concert with one party who was, in turn, acting in concert with

Id. at *2.
Id. at *4–5, 9.
35 Id. at *10.
36 Id. at *1. A “flip-in” provision allows other existing shareholders to
acquire additional stock of the target at a discount. Flip-Over Strategy,
CORP.
FIN.
INST.,
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/deals/flip-overstrategy/ [https://perma.cc/6B4X-T7RB] (last visited May 16, 2022).
37 In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL 754593, at *11. A “flipover” provision allows shareholders of the target to buy the acquirer’s stock
at a discount. Flip-Over Strategy, CORP. FIN. INST., supra note 36.
38 In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL 754593, at *10–11.
39 Id. at *10.
33
34
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another party.40 This aggressive provision could be lifted from
the criminal conspiracy playbook associated with serious
crimes like money laundering.41 Institutional investors seem
brought into this cabal merely through buying company
shares in anticipation of a challenge to management,
including, but not limited to, via proxy contest.
The beneficial ownership definition was further
embellished by inclusion of synthetic ownership of the
Company stock that was the “underlying” security in a total
return equity swap, which is cash-settled.42
A comprehensive opinion by Chancellor McCormick
enjoined the pill, principally through an application of the
Unocal/Unitrin framework.43 The Chancellor found that the
vague, omnibus threat that appeared to motivate the board to
adopt the pill did not justify the pill’s extreme provisions.44
The board had identified three threats:
[T]he desire to prevent stockholder activism during a
time of market uncertainty and a low stock price . . .
[;] the apprehension that hypothetical activists might
pursue ‘short-term’ agendas or distract management
from guiding [the Company] through uncertain times;
and . . . the concern that activists might stealthily and
rapidly accumulate over 5% of [the Company’s]
stock.45

Id. at *11.
See, e.g., United States v. Morelli, 168 F.3d 798, 798 (3d Cir. 1999);
Robert J. Rush & Frank R. Scarpetti, Russian Organized Crime: The
Continuation of an American Tradition, 22 DEVIANT BEHAV. 517, 527 (2001)
(discussing daisy chain in the context of white-collar crime); John
Braithwait, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White Collar Criminals,
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 723, 754 (1982) (“A potentially simple
transaction is intentionally concealed by a round robin or daisy chain
arrangement through a series of intermediary transactions.”).
42 In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL 754593, at *10–11.
43 See id. at *2 n.9, 40 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361
(Del. 1995)).
44 Id. at *26.
45 Id. at *2.
40
41
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The Chancellor simply rejected the first two purported
threats out of hand, as “contrary to the tenet of Delaware law
that directors cannot justify their actions by arguing that,
without board intervention, the stockholders would vote
erroneously out of ignorance or mistaken belief.”46 The
Chancellor also held that even assuming the validity of the
third threat, the Williams pill was “not proportional.”47
The Williams pill expired on its own terms in March 2021,
a year after its adoption.48 Yet, the defendants pursued an
appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court.49 Perhaps the spur
for the appeal was the award of $9.5 million in attorney’s
fees.50 But the Williams pill is a management wish list of tools
to suppress the possibility of an activist challenge. In
particular, it is designed to hunt down and kill off “wolfpacks,”
those aggregations of activist investors that purportedly
respond to one another’s call to create the appearance, if not
the fact, of a high level of shareholder dissatisfaction.51 In this
case, it was worth seeing if the Supreme Court would grant a
wolfpack hunting license.
In one sense, the extreme nature of the Williams poison
pill would have predicted for ready affirmance of the
Chancellor’s opinion. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed “on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the
Court of Chancery in its Memorandum Opinion.”52 But this
result was not foreordained, and it came at a moment when
the shareholder-centric model of corporate governance is
under scrutiny, if not attack. The Business Roundtable has
Id.
Id.
48 Jeff Montgomery, Williams Cos. Says Toss of Del. Poison Pill Tilted
Playing
Field,
LAW360
(Oct.
20,
2021,
4:40
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1432798/williams-cos-says-toss-of-delpoison-pill-tilted-playing-field (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review).
49 Williams Cos. v. Wolosky, 264 A.3d 641 (Del. Nov. 3, 2021)
(unpublished table disposition) (mem.).
50 See Montgomery, supra note 48.
51 See In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL 754593, at *11, 33
(discussing “wolfpack” provision in the Williams poison pill).
52 Williams Cos., 264 A.3d at 641.
46
47
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issued a statement that is widely interpreted to deprioritize
the interests of shareholders in favor of stakeholders.53
Managerial and political elites have pushed for “new
paradigms,”54 “common sense” principles,55 and “inclusive
capitalism.”56 Asset managers have issued statements
supportive of a broad conception of the corporate “purpose.”57
The case against activism flies under two flags. The first,
the traditional approach, is that activist pressures lead firms
53 See Press Release, Bus. Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines
the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All
Americans’ (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/businessroundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economythat-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/RHP2-DTMP] [hereinafter
“Business Roundtable Press Release”] (“Each of our stakeholders is
essential. We commit to deliver value to all of them, for the future success
of our companies, our communities and our country.”). For a criticism of the
meaningfulness of these statements, see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto
Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance, 106 CORNELL L.
REV. 91, 126 (2020) (arguing that the Business Roundtable statement
“should be viewed as mostly for show rather than the harbinger of a major
change.”).
54 See Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance: The New Paradigm,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-governance-the-newparadigm/ [https://perma.cc/L69Z-TYAP] (“The ‘New Paradigm’ is an
emerging corporate governance framework that derives from the
recognition . . . that short-termism and attacks by short-term financial
activists significantly impede long-term economic prosperity.”).
55 Ira M. Millstein Ctr. for Glob. Mkts. & Corp. Ownership,
Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance 2.0, COLUM. L. SCH.,
https://millstein.law.columbia.edu/content/commonsense-principles-20
[https://perma.cc/KP57-3UL3] (last visited May 16, 2022) (including as
signatories CEOs of large public companies and large institutional
investors).
56 COAL.
FOR
INCLUSIVE
CAPITALISM,
https://www.coalitionforinclusivecapitalism.com/ [https://perma.cc/9ZWSZWE4] (last visited May 16, 2022) (partnering with leaders on “initiatives
to make capitalism inclusive and its benefits more widely and equitably
shared”).
57 See, e.g., Larry Fink, A Sense of Purpose, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Jan. 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/17/asense-of-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/J3D6-LWPZ] (stating that society
demands companies “serve a social purpose”).
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to think about the short term rather than the long term.58
Managers who are busily fighting off activists (or acting preemptively to avoid such a confrontation) are short-changing
investments (e.g., R&D) that will produce greater value in the
long run in order to demonstrate superior short-term results
that will keep the activists at bay.59 This is bad from the
perspective of both long-term shareholders and society
because of the sacrifice of long-term economic growth.60
The second, more recent attack on activism is that its focus
on shareholder value heightens income and wealth
inequality.61 Managers who are concentrating on delivering
the highest returns for shareholders will hold down employee
wages, which suppresses wage growth.62 Moreover, executives
are partly, sometimes principally, paid through stock-based
compensation, which means that increasing shareholder
returns may in itself exacerbate income inequality.63
Additionally, because the distribution of public share
ownership is skewed to the top ten percent and even the top
one percent,64 success at increasing stock values will
exacerbate wealth inequality.65
See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The
Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 1 ANNALS CORP.
GOVERNANCE 545, 572 (2016).
59 Id. at 574–76.
60 Id. at 576. For a discussion of the empirical evidence, or lack thereof,
supporting the long-term economic case against activism, see Holger
Spamann, Indirect Investor Protection: The Investment Ecosystem and its
Legal Underpinnings, 14 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript
at 23 n. 91), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3707249
(on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
61 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-andBlood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate
Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1942 (2017).
62 Id. at. 1942–41.
63 See id. at 1925–26.
64 Jared Bernstein, Perspective, Yes, Stocks Are Up. But 80 Percent of
the Value Is Held by the Richest 10 Percent, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/02/perspectiv
e-on-the-stock-market-rally-80-of-stock-value-held-by-top-10/
[https://perma.cc/856W-NHQS].
65 See generally Leo Strine, supra note 61.
58
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These concerns have taken on national political valence.
Before the 2020 election, an influential senator proposed a
semi-federalization of corporate law.66 President Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. has publicly called out the disparity between
productivity growth and wage growth as the disconnect
“between the success of our economy and the [workers] who
produce that success.”67 It was thus not inconceivable that the
Delaware Supreme Court would have seen advantage in
preempting potential federal encroachment on state corporate
law through a doctrinal move that might relieve some
pressure. Delaware has a history of judicial turnaround68 and

66 Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced the Accountable Capitalism
Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. 2018 (2018). Senator Warren re-introduced the
legislation in 2020. S.3215, 116th Cong. (2020).
67 President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Address at Cuyahoga Community
College: Remarks by President Biden on the Economy (May 27, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2021/05/27/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-economy-2/
[https://perma.cc/NY78-JLPZ].
68 For example, the series of cases attempting to govern freeze-out
mergers and going-private transactions and then refashioning the appraisal
remedy and appropriate fiduciary standards, beginning with Singer v.
Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) and culminating with Weinberger v.
UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), which refashioned the appraisal remedy to
avoid prior opportunistic use of “Delaware block” and heightened fiduciary
standards at a time when federalization of corporate law was under
discussion. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate
Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 27–30, 29 tbl.1 (2009).
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legislative measures69 that seem calibrated to address such
hydraulics.70
Moreover, the Delaware courts have a history of slapping
down actors who they see as misusing the Delaware system.
This is surely at least a partial explanation for decisions like
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings71 and In re Trulia, Inc.
Stockholder Litigation72 that target plaintiffs’ lawyers and the
several appraisal decisions that have drained the juice out of
appraisal arbitrage pursued by hedge funds.73 Given these
factors, it would have been a surprise, but not a shock, for the
Delaware Supreme Court to have reversed the Chancery
Court decision in the Williams case in whole or in part in the
course of broadening the occasions for use of the poison pill
and expanding the range of permitted features.
69 See, e.g., 77 Del. Laws 19 (2009) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
112) (adopting shareholder proxy access legislation at a time of concerted
proposals for a federal proxy access mandate). In June and July 2009, only
a couple of months after Delaware’s amendments, the SEC proposed rules
related to proxy access. See Proxy Disclosure and Solicitation
Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 9052, Exchange Act Release No.
60,280, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,817, 74 Fed. Reg. 35,076
(proposed July 17, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239, 240, 249,
270, 274); Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Securities Act
Release No. 9046, Exchange Act Release No. 60,089, Investment Company
Act Release No. 28,765, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (proposed June 17, 2009) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249, 279).
70 See Roe, supra note 68.
71 125 A.3d 304, 306 (2015) (holding that disinterested majority
shareholder approval in an arm’s length merger provides a basis for
dismissing a suit seeking post-closing damages before discovery and other
litigation elements that create settlement value). For a discussion of Corwin
and its implications, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s
Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware
Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 337 (2018).
72 129 A.3d. 884, 887 (Del Ch. 2016) (rejecting proposed class action
settlement providing only unimportant additional disclosure prior to
shareholder vote but including a global release of possible fiduciary claims).
For a discussion of Trulia and its implications, see Matthew D. Cain et al.,
The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REV. 603 (2018).
73 See Wei Jiang, Tao Li & Randall Thomas, The Long Rise and Quick
Fall of Appraisal Arbitrage, 100 B.U. L. REV. 2133, 2147–54 (2020)
(discussing appraisal decisions).
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Nevertheless, such a move would amount to a major
wrench to the Delaware corporate governance system. It
would require a re-basing of the rationale for the poison pill,
which operates through discrimination against particular
common shareholders and whose core legitimacy has been
premised on the ultimate power of the shareholder
franchise.74 Moreover, an empowered anti-activist pill would
operate not just against the hedge fund activists—the villains
de jour—but also against ESG activists, just now gaining
influence, as reflected in the recent ExxonMobil contest.75
Indeed, judicial validation of the anti-activist pill could kill off
ESG activism just as it gets a head of steam.76
Giving in to the pressures would be short-termist. Having
just said no to anti-activist pills, the Delaware Supreme Court
(and the friends of Delaware) should hold to principles that
stabilize and vindicate Delaware’s approach to corporate
governance over the long term. The anti-activist pill is simply
outside the core legitimating principles of Delaware law,
which reside in protection of the shareholder franchise.
Unlike the original pill, which was designed to restore the
board to its traditional structural role in vetting proposed
mergers, the anti-activist pill is designed to protect the board
against shareholder pressure expressed through director
elections. The Court, which has on many occasions insisted on
the importance of the shareholder franchise, including quite

74 See e.g., Martin Lipton, Pills, Poll, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1037, 1037, 1054, 1056 (2002).
75 Chris James and his small investment startup, Engine No. 1,
successfully pursued a climate proxy campaign that led to shareholders
electing three directors to Exxon’s board. Saijel Kishan & Joe Carroll, The
Little Engine That Won an Environmental Victory over Exxon, BLOOMBERG,
(June 9, 2021, 1:19 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0609/engine-no-1-proxy-campaign-against-exxon-xom-marks-win-for-esgactivists [https://perma.cc/M4BJ-8YZQ].
76 See Matt Levine, Opinion, Exxon Lost a Climate Proxy Fight,
BLOOMBERG,
(May
27,
2021,
12:55
PM)
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-05-27/exxon-lost-aclimate-proxy-fight [https://perma.cc/293E-MDAC] (describing interaction
between ESG activist and asset managers).
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recently,77 should feel comfortable in putting an end to this
aberrant turn in corporate governance.78

IV. THE PILL: ORIGINS AND THE ANTI-ACTIVIST
RENEGADE
The “shareholder rights plan” that came to be known as
the “poison pill,” or simply “the pill,” was forged in the fires of
the takeover wars that erupted in the 1970s and early 1980s.79
In the struggle for control over large companies, bidders
wielded the tender offer, which became a legitimate and

Coster v. UIP Cos., 255 A.3d 952, 960–61 (Del. 2021) (remanding a
decision on whether to cancel a stock sale to the Chancery Court with
instructions that “if the court decides that the board acted for inequitable
purposes or in good faith but for the primary purpose of disenfranchisement
without a compelling justification, it should cancel the Stock Sale”).
78 In an analysis of the shareholder welfare effects of the adoption of
“crisis pills” (approximately fifty adoptions from March 2020 through May
2020), Eldar and Wittry show that for firms with the greatest exposure to
the crisis (as reflected in stock price decline) and a “meaningful stake
increase,” subsequent adoption of a pill produced economically significant
returns, 12.7% on the adoption day and 24% in the 10-day window including
adoption day. Eldar & Wittry, supra note 1, at 207, 209–10. Firms that did
not experience a “meaningful stake increase” prior to the adoption of a pill
did not experience positive returns upon the adoption of crisis pills. Id. at
209. From this Eldar and Wittry infer that pill adoption could create value
by permitting undistracted managerial attention to the difficult matters at
hand. Id. at 205, 207. Putting aside the small “n” problem, a reasonable
interpretation might go otherwise: Pill adoption in these circumstances was
the harbinger of a possible future bid at a premium to the market price,
because the main utility of the pill these days is to permit a target to
orchestrate a competitive bidding process in a consensual environment.
Activism should be considered disruptive only if there is a credible threat of
a successful proxy battle; but the Williams court rejects a cognizable threat
in such circumstances. See In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., No. 20200707-KSJM, 2021 WL 754593 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021) (McCormick, C.).
79 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ed Rock, How I Learned To Stop Worrying
and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
871, 873–75 (2002) (the history and formation of the poison pill); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1931 1937–
48 (1991) (discussing the same); John V. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the
Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 271,
275–76 (2000) (discussing the ubiquity of the pill).
77
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common tactic around the time of the enactment of the
Williams Act in 1968 and the follow-on SEC regulations.80
Target management’s defensive measures were limited,
sometimes consisting of measures, such as asset dispositions
or acquisitions designed to make the target less attractive to
the hostile bidder,81 that also disrupted the target’s prior
business plan and that may well have reduced target
shareholder value.
The pill ingeniously combined two elements. First was the
set of Delaware corporate finance statutes that established
the board’s power to issue “rights” to purchase shares82 and
then to prescribe the terms of “blank check” preferred stock. 83
Second was the just-inaugurated (in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.)84 power of the board to adopt defensive
measures that would discriminate against a shareholder who
made an unwanted bid.85 But the pill persisted because it
solved a certain structural problem while not undermining
core principles of Delaware corporate governance.
The statutory set up relating to mergers contemplated a
two-step process: first, agreement by the board to a merger
proposal and its terms; second, a subsequent shareholder vote
on the merger agreement.86 It turned out that the board’s
prerogative depended upon a friction: the collective action
costs of shareholder override given the dispersed ownership of
In 1960, there were 8 tender offers, while there were 107 in 1966.
113 CONG. REC. 9339 (1967) (statement of Sen. Harrison A. Williams)).
81 See Lipton, supra note 74, at 1043.
82 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a)–(b) (2021) (permitting the issuance of
rights to acquire stock).
83 Id. § 151(a), (g) (conferring the board authority to specify terms of a
new class of stock). The flip-over pill hands out “flip over” rights in a
discriminatory way but can be avoided by a patient acquirer who, after
obtaining control, gradually accumulates the balance of the target’s stock
through open market purchases. The acquirer cannot avoid the
discriminatory impact of a flip-in pill, especially since the target board can
issue successive poison pills. See Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, 5 A.3d
586, 606 (Del. 2010) (allowing pill “reloading”).
84 493 A.2d 946, 957–58 (Del. 1985).
85 Id.
86 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251 (2021).
80
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a large public corporation. The key element of the hostile
takeover was the control entrepreneurs’ ability to overcome
this friction through a tender offer to obtain at least a majority
of shares so as to be able to remove directors or to prevail at
the next annual meeting. By imposing a severe economic
penalty for crossing a particular sub-control threshold, the pill
blocked the tender offer as a form of structural work around.
Another critical feature, however, was the retention by the
board of the power to redeem the pill before a party crossed
the ownership threshold. This element induced the would-be
acquirer to negotiate with the board. Thus, the post-pill board
had approval rights over merger terms prior to shareholder
action, restoring the structural status quo.
The initial justification for the reestablishment of this
status quo was the “threat” that particular bids presented to
the shareholders, whose inability to coordinate required
intervention of the board. The initial threat, pivotal in both
Unocal and Moran v. Household International, Inc.,87 was the
structural coercion inherent in a front-loaded two-tier bid, in
which the bid structure could induce tendering even by
shareholders whose reservation price was above the bid price.
On the assumption that your own vote was not pivotal, the
rational response to such a bid was to tender, even if you
believed the offer was too low, because if it turned out that the
offer succeeded, you would at least receive a mix that included
the higher front-end consideration rather than entirely the
lower back end.88
With the assist of capital market developments, bidders
turned to “any and all” cash offers which were designed to
avoid the objection of Unocal. The pivotal case is Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., decided in 1989, in which
the Delaware Supreme Court held that such a bid could
nevertheless be subject to a preclusive defensive tactic.89 This
500 A. 2d 1346, 1338–39 (Del. 1985).
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Story of Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum: The
Core of Takeover Law, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 227 (J. Mark Ramseyer,
ed., 2009) (explaining prisoner’s dilemma of a front-loaded two-tier bid).
89 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del.
1989).
87
88
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paved the way for a target’s invocation of a “just say no”
defense in the refusal to redeem a pill when confronted with
an all cash, all shares bid.90 The case is commonly regarded
as having embraced a theory that “substantive coercion”—a
bid whose apparent appeal can misdirect shareholder
judgment—is the “threat” that justifies such measures.91 The
notion of “substantive coercion” is introduced only in a
footnote, however.92 Rather, the court framed its opinion in
terms of protecting board prerogative: “Plaintiffs’ position
represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of
review under Unocal principally because it would involve the
court in substituting its judgment as to what is a ‘better’ deal
for that of a corporation’s board of directors.”93
In short, the case stands for Delaware’s “board-centric”
approach when it comes to mergers and acquisitions. The
board can authorize target defense tactics against a share
purchase offer made to shareholders in which formally the
company is a bystander because actions that would result in a
merger ought to be vetted by the board in the first instance. The
subsequent cases that establish the need for a “fiduciary out”
in a merger agreement rest on the distinctive role of the target
board in initiating and superintending a merger.94 The
subsequent cases that bar pill provisions that would limit the
authority of post-proxy contest directors focus on the

See Gordon, supra note 79, at 1941 (discussing implications of Time).
See, e.g., Air Prods. and Chem., Inc v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 98,
108–109 (Del. Ch. 2011) (Chandler, C.); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists
in Making It Work, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 2019, at 8, 18.
92 Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153 n.17 (discussing the concept as
introduced in Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s
Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to
Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW., 247, 267 (1989)).
93 Id. at 1153.
94 See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
47 (1993) (finding that deal protection provisions in a merger agreement
“may not validly define or limit the directors’ fiduciary duties under
Delaware law or prevent the [target] directors from carrying out their
fiduciary duties under Delaware law”).
90
91
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“fundamental importance” of the board’s responsibilities in
“negotiating a possible sale of the corporation.”95
In creating “board centrism” in the case of mergers, the
Delaware courts did not establish a self-perpetuating board or
“Platonic masters.”96 Just the opposite: Business disputes are
to be channeled through the corporate governance machinery
in which director elections are the means by which
shareholders can exert control over the direction of the firm.
Indeed, the shareholder franchise has been accepted as a
cornerstone principle of the legitimacy of director authority.
In the famous phrasing of Chancellor Allen in Blasius, “The
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon
which the legitimacy of directorial power rests. . . . [I]t is
critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power by
some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of
property that they do not own.”97
In this respect, shareholder activism reflects the triumph
of Delaware’s board-centric governance. Like a hostile bidder,
an activist takes its proposal initially to the board. If rejected,
the activist’s next move is different: not a tender offer but a
proxy contest; not generally even a contest for a majority of
board seats, but a short-slate contest for a serious voice in the
boardroom and perhaps an alternative strategic plan. Because
an activist starts with only a small percentage of the
company’s stock and no intention to obtain a control block, the
activist ultimately must persuade the large institutional
owners that are the majority owners of most large public
corporations. Such persuasion requires communication with
other shareholders and can lead to communication among
shareholders who are trying to assess the arguments and

95 Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291–92 (Del.
1998); see also Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 723 A 2d. 1180, 1191 (Del.
Ch. 1998) (Jacobs, V.C.). (redeeming the pill essential to board’s power to
“achieve a business combination”).
96 Blasius Indus., Inc. v Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988)
(Allen, C.).
97 Id. at 559.
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rebuttals of the activists and the insurgents. The core of
shareholder governance is debate and deliberation.98
Reflection on Moran reminds us of how far the anti-activist
pill deviates from the original justification for a pill’s
extraordinary discrimination against a stockholder.99 The
plaintiff objected that the twenty percent trigger in the
Household pill “fundamentally restricts stockholders’ right to
conduct a proxy contest.”100 The court’s response was that
while the threshold would “deter” some proxy efforts, it would
not necessarily “frustrate[]” them.101 In other words, the
impediments to waging a proxy battle were a regrettable (but
not fatal) side effect of the pill’s protection against the threat
of a coercive bid.

V. THE RENEGADE THEORY OF THE ANTIACTIVIST PILL
By contrast, in an anti-activist pill, the regrettable side
effect is precisely the point. That is, the activist has no plan to
push through a merger with a hostile bid, coercive in one way
or another. Rather, the activist is pursuing a change in the
corporation’s business plan and perhaps board representation
98 See Edward Rock & Marcel Kahan, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, 99 B.U.
L. REV. 915, 965–967 (2019).
99 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Until
Unocal and then Moran, no Delaware case had permitted the discrimination
against a shareholder that is the heart of a pill. The citation to Cheff v.
Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) and other cases entailing “greenmail” are
inapt. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354 (citing Chef, 199 A.2d at 548). The
“discrimination” in such cases runs in favor of the greenmailer, who in any
event has consented to the transaction; the potentially discriminatedagainst parties are the remaining shareholders. They are both the
shareholder majority (so can discipline the errant officers and directors) and
are purportedly benefited, not injured, by the disparate treatment, which
rids the corporation of a raider whose plan would purportedly reduce
shareholder value. The discrimination in an anti-activist pill is targeted
against the activism proponent and, through in its inhibition of proxy
contests, undermines the very mechanism that legitimates its use. Its point
is entrenchment.
100 Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355.
101 Id.

No. 1:206]

THE REJECTED THREAT OF CORPORATE VOTE SUPPRESION

229

and is using the possibility of a proxy contest—a contested
election of directors—to promote this objective. The very point
of the activist pill is to disrupt the possibility of a proxy
contest, for without that credible threat, the activist has no
power. Without a credible threat of a proxy contest, the
shareholder activist is a kibitzing gadfly.
A low ownership trigger of course reduces the prospects for
success in a proxy contest. A low trigger means the activist
can immediately command fewer votes; more shareholders
must be persuaded. A low trigger also caps the activist’s skin
in the game, which could undercut the activist’s credibility
with the shareholders it must persuade as well as limiting the
activist’s economic upside, which is tied to share
appreciation.102 But as the recent Exxon-Mobil proxy contest
illustrated, a low threshold does not necessarily make a
successful proxy contest unattainable.103 For the largest
corporations, with market capitalizations in the tens or
hundreds of billions of dollars, serious skin in the game begins
below five percent.104
The evil genius in the anti-activist pill is the effort to
disrupt shareholder communication through an overbroad
definition of “beneficial owner.” The definition of “beneficial
ownership” in the section 13(d) regulations focuses on having
or sharing “voting power” and/or “investment power” and that
102 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 11, at 902–04 (discussing how
activists gain credibility); see also Rock & Kahan, supra note 81, at 923–25
(discussing the importance of pill thresholds to activists if not necessarily
hostile bidders).
103
Engine No. 1, the initiator of the proxy contest, owned 0.02% of
Exxon-Mobil’s stock. Kishan & Carroll, supra note 75.
104 Compare Alexandra Stevenson & Brain X. Chen, Icahn Amps Up
Pressure on Apple, but His Stake Limits His Leverage, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK,
(Oct.
24,
2013,
9:48
AM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/icahn-tries-new-tack-to-stirthings-up-at-apple-his-own-web-site/ (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review), with Chuck Jones, Carl Icahn Sold Apple Too Soon & It Cost
Him
$3.7B,
FORBES,
(Nov.
10,
2017,
8:18
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckjones/2017/11/10/carl-icahn-sold-appletoo-soon-it-cost-him-3-7b/?sh=75c2b2a82cea
[https://perma.cc/D8XRVHJL]) (earning $2 billion profit while pushing for subsequently executed
stock buybacks; maximum ownership percentage approximately 0.5%).
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acquisition of beneficial ownership through a “group” requires
parties to “agree to act together.”105 The added concept of
parallelism—acting towards a common goal chain-linked to
parties you may not know—expands the idea of “sharing”
power and “agreement” without discernible boundaries. This
afternoon, perhaps 30,000 people will have acted in parallel to
buy tickets to a Yankees game with the common purpose of
influencing the outcome through simultaneous cheering (or
perhaps booing), and many will buy tickets and go precisely
because they know others are acting in the same way. So,
under the activist pill definitions, they may be “acting in
concert.” Playing with the definition in this way is sport, but
imposing a risk on a financial fiduciary of substantial dilution
of a portfolio position because of a shallow interaction will chill
communication.
Notice the reinforcing interaction between the low pill
triggers and the capacious definition of beneficial ownership.
A low pill trigger is an immediate impediment because it
reduces the prospective activist’s potential upside. The allinclusive definition of beneficial ownership is an impediment
because it makes organization and success in a proxy contest
more difficult. Yet the two reinforce one another, perversely:
The lower the pill trigger, the greater the need to bring along
other shareholders for success in a proxy contest. Yet as such
organizational activity becomes more widespread, the greater
the risk that other shareholders will be snared as “beneficial
owners.” With a low pill trigger, the activist will necessarily
105 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-3(a), 13d-5 (b)(1) (2021). The SEC has recently
proposed amending the rules issued under section 13(d) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act in a way that could substantially broaden the prior
definition of “beneficial owner” to encompass the acting in concert provisions
of the Williams pill and similar versions. See Modernization of Beneficial
Ownership, Securities Act Release No. 11,030, Exchange Act Release No.
94,211, 87 Fed. Reg. 13,846, 13,868–69, 13,877 (proposed Mar. 10, 2022) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 232, 240). Although it seems accepted by
practitioners that Delaware courts would accept the current SEC definition
of beneficial ownership as used in a pill trigger, the capacious definition of
the proposed rule ought not be acceptable in Delaware “pill” law because of
its disruptive effects on the shareholders capacity to organize a proxy
contest.
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depend upon various forms of parallel and common behavior
for success; yet it is those actions that present serious risks of
economic harm to shareholders who could be found to be
“beneficial owners” under the activist pill’s definition. “The
features of an anti-activist pill are not separately
impediments to a proxy contest; the low pill threshold and the
high risks of communication or even common behavior and
purpose are designed to work together to provide protection
and insulation.”106
To recap: The original “poison pill” was designed to restore
the structural status quo in the board’s plenary power to vet
and approve mergers in which the company would be
acquired. It has been repurposed as an anti-activist pill for an
altogether different (and illegitimate) purpose: to disrupt the
capacity of a shareholder activist to mobilize the election
machinery to resolve a disagreement over business
strategy.107
This difference becomes apparent in considering one of the
essential features of a pill: the board’s reserved redemption
right. Until the parties cross the beneficial ownership
106 Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporate Vote Suppression: The Anti-Activist
Pill in The Williams Companies Stockholder Litigation, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Aug. 19, 2021), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2021/08/19/corporatevote-suppression-the-anti-activist-pill-in-the-williams-companiesstockholder-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/W6UA-KQLE].
107 The net-operating loss (NOL) poison pill, capping existing
shareholders who hold five percent of a company to an additional increase
of one-half a percent of ownership, validated in Versata Enters., Inc. v.
Selectica, 5 A.3d 586, 588 (Del. 2010) is a one-off. Because of the
peculiarities of the federal tax regime governing net operating loss
carryforwards, the very act of acquiring five percent or more of a company’s
stock could cause harm. Such an acquisition in combination with stock
purchases by other shareholders could subject the company to an unwanted
(by anyone) “ownership change.” See Yona A. Kornsgold, Note, Beginner’s
Luck That Hertz: Bankrupt Companies and the Trap for Retail Investors,
2021 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 915, 949 & n.136 (explaining the mechanics and
tax implications of an ownership change for the purposes of net operating
losses). A pill designed to forestall a “creeping” tender offer is designed to
protect the structural primacy of the board in negotiating mergers or a
change in control that is foreseeably a prelude to a merger. See Yucaipa Am.
All. Fund II v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 313 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.).
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threshold, the board has the capacity to redeem the pill.
Notice how differently this functions in the context of a
potential hostile bid versus a proxy contest. In the case of the
bid, the board’s redemption right serves as the mechanism to
channel merger proposals for board vetting: If the board
approves, friendly negotiations ensue and the board redeems
the pill. The pill (or “shadow pill”)108 can be used by the board
to facilitate negotiations among several competing friendly
bidders; the pill guarantees that none of the bidders can steal
a march through a tender offer. The pill and its redemption
enable the board to vet all possible mergers and orchestrate
the competition.
How would this work in the case of the anti-activist pill?
Well, obviously, it wouldn’t. “We want to challenge your
control of the corporation because you have made strategic
and operational mistakes. Please give us permission to
acquire more stock to give us greater economic upside and
permission to enlist other shareholders in this venture.”
Really? It is the misfit of the redemption right that
emphasizes how the anti-activist pill is an illegitimate effort
to supplant the shareholders’ core corporate governance
rights. The pill does not work without a redemption right; it
becomes a dead-hand pill squared. As Chancellor Chandler
observed, the pill on its face is preclusive; it is the viability of
a proxy contest that could lead to its redemption that is its
saving grace.109 Yet it is the very point of an anti-activist pill
to interfere with prospects for a successful proxy contest by a
party that is not seeking a merger.110
A “shadow pill” is the ever-present threat that a board can enact a
poison pill as soon as a bidder emerges. Coates, supra note 79, at 286–87
(2000).
109 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, 16 A.3d 48, 122 n.480 (Del. Ch.
2011) (Chandler, C.) (“The tender offer is in fact precluded and the only
bypass of the pill is electing a new board. If that is the law, it would be best
to be honest and abandon the pretense that preclusive action is per
se unreasonable.”).
110 In the Delaware doctrinal framework regarding the pill, the
shareholder capacity to run a proxy contest that could replace a recalcitrant
board with one that might redeem the pill is crucial to a determination that
the pill is not impermissibly “preclusive.” Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp.,
108
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In the case of proxy contest initiated by a hostile bidder the
point of which is to replace incumbents with directors likely to
favor the proposed acquisition, the bidder’s needs to acquire a
significant block of stock or to promote deliberation among the
shareholders are both low. If the bidder couples its proxy
contest with a conditional cash tender offer, virtually the only
issue for the other shareholders is the bid’s adequacy. The
shareholders do not need to be persuaded on potential private
benefits extraction by a new controller, or the desirability of a
new business plan, or board room dynamics. By contrast, in a
proxy contest waged by an activist, these are very real issues;
they will arise at all stages in the run up to an actual proxy
battle as an activist considers its strategy, and an anti-activist
pill is aimed against the necessary deliberation among
shareholders. The actions that make a proxy contest feasible
trigger the pill’s economic penalty.
Thus, it is clear: The goal of the anti-activist pill is to
preclude challenges to the board’s power, entrenchment per
se. This is vote suppression, corporate style. Under current
conceptions of Delaware law, it cannot stand. There is no
“compelling justification” that would sustain such an action.
Chancellor McCormick was surely right that the Williams pill
fails under Unocal as a disproportionate response. But as
Chancellor Allen wrote in Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc.,
Blasius is the right standard for a pill, like the anti-activist
pill in this case, that “represent[s] action taken for the
primary purpose of interfering with the exercise of the

651 A.2d 1361, 1389–90 (Del. 1995); see Versata Enters., Inc., 5 A.3d at 601
(“A defensive measure is preclusive where it ‘makes a bidder’s ability to
wage a successful proxy contest and gain control . . . realistically
unattainable’” (quoting Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195
(Del. Ch. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The goal of the antiactivist pill is to eliminate the “realistic attainability” of a proxy contest
success and thus is inherently preclusive. Moreover, the validity of such a
pill, which changes the fundamental nature of share ownership, may be
open to challenge under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2021), which seems
to require a charter amendment to change the voting power of common
stock.
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shareholders’ right to elect directors.”111 The importance of
the shareholder franchise was recently underscored by Chief
Justice Seitz in Coster v. UIP Cos. in an opinion that fully
embraced Blasius and its progeny: “[T]o invoke Blasius the
challenged board action ‘only need[s] to be taken for the
primary purpose of interfering with or impeding the
effectiveness of the stockholder vote in a contested election for
directors.’”112 This is indeed the objective of the anti-activist
pill in the Williams case. If anything, the Delaware Supreme
Court should be forthright in its defense of shareholder
democracy.

VI. ACTIVISM AS “MISTARGETING”
A recent article by Zohar Goshen and Reilly Steel mounts
a defense of anti-activist pills on the grounds that activists are
likely to “mistarget” firms—“mistakenly shaking things up at
firms that only appear to be underperforming”—and thereby
will reduce shareholder and social wealth.113 Activists, they
say, are probably worse than hostile bidders—“raiders.”114 A
hostile bidder, because it seeks one hundred percent of the
company, has strong incentives to “invest more in information
and to take only prudent risks.”115 Once it acquires one
hundred percent of a firm, a hostile bidder will have full access
to the firm’s information and thus can reverse shake-up plans
that are revealed to be unwise.116 An activist has a much
smaller stake, less than ten percent, and so will be more
aggressive with a lower “hurdle rate,” and even after
successful activism will have insufficient information to
update prior plans.117 Goshen and Steel regard the Williams

111 Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. 11510, 1990 WL 114222, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) (Allen, C.) (unpublished).
112 Coster v. UIP Cos., 255 A.3d 952, 962 (Del. 2021) (citing MM Cos.,
Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (2003)).
113 Goshen & Steel, supra note 6 (manuscript at 3) (emphasis omitted).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. (manuscript at 4).
117 Id. (manuscript at 3–4).
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case as incorrectly decided118 and argue that the case should
be cabined as pertaining only to an extreme pill, one that
combines both a low ownership trigger point and a broad
acting-in-concert provision. Goshen and Steel endorse a
notion of proportionality that would trade off the level of
trigger points against the breadth of acting-in-concert
provisions.119
The main analytic move in the article is to explain away
the persistent pattern of positive returns on average to
shareholder activism (approximately seven percent)120 and,
more importantly, the general support of shareholder
activism by large institutional investors and the proxy
advisors, who have strong incentives to observe the
performance of specific activists and activism targets in
repeat play.121 To transform the authors’ conjecture about the
appearance of underperformance into a baseball analogy: The
shareholder activists consistently convert homeruns and
grand slams into singles and doubles. The fans think they are
seeing an effective offense only because they cannot observe
the missing fireworks that the displaced managers would
have delivered.
In justly acclaimed prior work, one of the authors argued
that the permissible set of governance arrangements ought to
include those that protect the “idiosyncratic vision” of the
entrepreneur.122 This becomes a justification for favorable
attitudes toward controlling owners and dual class common
stock, classified boards, and other management-protective
elements that are often found in today’s initial public
offerings.123 “Mistargeting,” however, seems to assume that
every CEO—who advanced their way up the corporate
Id. (manuscript at 51).
Goshen & Steel, supra note 6 (manuscript at 56–57).
120 See, e.g., Brav et al., supra note 18.
121 Id. (manuscript at 6–9, 12, 26).
122 Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and
Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 594 (2016) (“[W]e argue that
controlling shareholders’ rights play, and should play, a critical role in
corporate law.”).
123 Id. at 598–605.
118
119
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hierarchy—could be a Henry Ford, that every struggling firm
could be an Apple, and that corporate law, in an effort to avoid
shareholder mistakes (“principal costs”), should suppress a
particularly
effective
mechanism
of
managerial
accountability: the proxy contest.124
In comparing activism and a hostile bid, the article seems
founded on some misapprehensions about the irrevocability of
a prior mistargeting. In the case of activism, if the target’s
management and board disagree with the activist’s proposal,
presumably they will resist the proposal consistent with their
fiduciary duty to shareholders.125 The activist’s recourse is to
initiate a proxy contest (or the threat of one) with a “short

124 Indeed, Henry Ford was soon outstripped by the managerial genius
of Alfred Sloan at General Motors (GM), who was subject to oversight by the
DuPont family blockholders. See generally ALFRED P. SLOAN, JR., MY YEARS
WITH GENERAL MOTORS (1963); Anthony Patrick O’Brien, How To Succeed in
Business: Lessons from the Struggle Between Ford and General Motors
During the 1920s and 1930s, 18 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 79 (1989). Goshen and
Steel’s further claim is to connect the outsized growth of superstar firms to
unaccountable CEOs. See Goshen & Steel, supra note 6 (manuscript at 16–
17). The dominance of GM in its period of highest growth points in a
different direction as does the prodigal son story of Steve Jobs and the
roaring success of post-Jobs Apple. Bill Gates divested himself of a control
block in Microsoft. Jeff Bezos has retained significant stock ownership but
not control of Amazon. Mark Zuckerberg (Meta Platforms) and Larry Page
and Sergey Brin (Alphabet) use dual class common stock to secure control,
which is achieved through the shareholder consent to a particular charter
term in an initial public offering, not an anti-activist pill. More generally,
the account of superstar firms that account for a disproportionate share of
growth, Goshen & Steele, supra note 6 (manuscript at 33–34), points to
deeper changes in the marketplace rather than a flourishing of idiosyncratic
vision that needs the protection of an anti-activist pill. David Autor et al.,
The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms, Q. J. ECON.
645, 649–51 (2020) (describing various characteristics of the “superstar
firm”).
125 Perhaps they will be hampered by their inability to reveal to the
marketplace the “hidden information” about an impending product launch
or other ventures that would lose value upon premature disclosure because
of loss of a first mover window. They could still claim the superiority of their
plans in a general way and need not capitulate just because they cannot be
fully revelatory.
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slate” of director nominees.126 “Success” then means board
representation via a proxy contest or through a settlement in
which management agrees to put a small number of new
directors on the board. The activist’s plans are not selfexecuting. A new board member has access to material nonpublic information about the firm and has the customary
fiduciary duties to consider that information in board
decision-making. Insofar as the activist is directly represented
on the board, the activist presumably is interested in
delivering performance, for the sake of its own holdings and
to preserve and enhance its reputation on which its business
model of repeat activism depends. Moreover, as is increasingly
common, the activist runs a short slate with highly-qualified
independents, who are only thinly tied to the activist.127 These
directors have particular reason to take a fresh look at their
initial assumptions in light of what they see on the inside.
Indeed, one of the most heralded cases of takeover defenses
shows how inside information can change opinions. In Air
Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc, Air Products
sought a combination with Airgas and made a premium
offer.128 Airgas rejected all overtures and stood behind a
Only rarely does the activist seek control. It is difficult to persuade
shareholders to grant unfettered control to a shareholder with only five-toten percent of the stock. Indeed, a small group of activists that do engage
deeply with the company are sometimes favorably reviewed by the
opponents of most activism. See Martin Lipton, The Trian/P&G Proxy
Contest, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Sept. 11, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/11/the-trianpg-proxy-contest/
[https://perma.cc/6N2H-3M36]
127 See LAZARD, CAP. MKTS. ADVISORY GRP., 2021 REVIEW OF
SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM
15
(2021),
https://www.lazard.com/media/452017/lazards-2021-review-of-shareholderactivism_vff.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRD3-UMFP] (reporting that over the
2018-2021 period, only twenty-five percent of directors named to boards
through activism have been employees of the activist, with at least sixty
percent having other public company board experience.)
128 Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 86 (Del. Ch.
2011) (Chandler, C.) (quoting an Air Products press release, which stated
that Air Products’ best and final offer of seventy dollars per share provided
a sixty-one percent premium to Airgas’ closing price on the day before Air
Products first announced an offer to acquire Airgas).
126

238

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2022

poison pill fortified by a classified board.129 Air Products won
a proxy contest to replace the three directors up for election.130
The legal issue in the case was whether it was “proportional”
to leave in place a poison pill despite a fully informed
shareholder vote for new directors that was in effect a
plebiscite on the proposed transaction.131 It turned out that
the new directors (the nominees of the “activist”) did their own
due diligence, insisted on additional outside review, and with
this is new information reversed their prior views about the
adequacy of the Air Products offer.132 Airgas remained
independent.133 This illustrates the point that there is no
reason to assume that activist nominees will be a “potted
plant” if they are elected to the board. If their exposure to nonpublic information shows them that management’s plan will
produce much greater value than the activist’s alternative,
why would we expect them not to act as appropriate
fiduciaries?
The case of a hostile bid is quite different. The very act of
acquiring one hundred percent of the target commits the
raider to a particular course of action regardless of what the
raider discovers once they have access to non-public
information. This is because the raider is almost certainly
financing the acquisition with bank borrowings or “high yield”
bonds and will depend on the target’s excess free cash or the
proceeds of a break-up to repay the debt. The very fact of the
Id. at 66–67, 70, 74, 76, 89.
Id. at 71–72.
131 Id. at 54, 92–93.
132 Id. at 89–90.
133 Airgas was eventually acquired by Air Liquide in 2016. Press
Release, Airgas, Air Liquide, Air Liquide Completes Acquisition of Airgas
(May
23,
2016),
https://www.airliquide.com/group/press-releasesnews/2016-05-23/air-liquide-completes-acquisition-airgas
[https://perma.cc/SJJ8-HQBQ]. The case is heralded as showing the value
of the pill. See Martin Lipton, The Long-Term Value of the Poison Pill, HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Dec.
18,
2015)
(https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/12/18/the-long-term-value-of-thepoison-pill/ [https://perma.cc/QE3S-YPXX] (describing the acquisition of
Airgas six years later at a price more than double the final rejected offer
from Air Products).
129
130
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leveraged acquisition to get one hundred percent ownership
forecloses many possible alternative paths. By the time the
raider sees the great recipe on the kitchen countertop, the
china is already broken.
Goshen and Steel seem particularly concerned about firing
CEOs “who are actually loyal and able,” regarding such firings
as especially likely in the case of activism because of the
limited information on which the activist proceeds.134 It
appears, however, that CEO turnover is in fact relatively
uncommon in the case of an activist campaign, occurring in
less than fifteen percent of cases within the first six months of
the launch of campaigns between 2018 and 2021.135 By
contrast, it is highly likely that turnover will occur after
almost every successful hostile bid. Even apart from the
animus generally associated with a hostile transaction, this
follows from the ubiquity of golden parachute agreements,
which generally confer a financial bonanza on a CEO after a
control transaction whether or not the CEO is formally
fired.136 CEOs commonly depart following takeovers, even
friendly deals,137 except in private equity take-privates.138
Surely hostile bids will skew toward turnover, even if the
hostile bidder comes to have “raiders regret.”
Goshen and Steel open with Bill Ackman and Pershing
Square’s failed effort to resuscitate a lagging retailer, J.C.
Penny and hedge fund star Eddie Lampert’s failure at

Goshen & Steel, supra note 6 (manuscript at 14) (citing Zohar
Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law
and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 786–88 (2017)).
135 LAZARD, supra note 130, at 16.
136 See Albert H. Choi, Andrew C.W. Lund & Robert Schonlau, Golden
Parachutes and the Limits of Shareholder Voting, 73 VAND. L. REV. 223,
232–33 (2020).
137 Julie Wulf & Harbir Singh, How Do Acquirers Retain Successful
Target CEOs? The Role of Governance, 57 MGMT. SCI. 2101, 2107, 2112
(2011); Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek & David Yermack, What’s in It for Me?
CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 41 (2004).
138 Leonce L. Bargeron et al., What Is the Shareholder Wealth Impact
of Target CEO Retention in Private Equity Deals?, 46 J. CORP. FIN. 186, 187
(2017).
134
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Sears.139 But Lampert came to own nearly fifty percent of
Sears.140 He was more a less successful Ronald Perlman
(Revlon) than a prototypical hedge fund activist. The failure
of many raiders in the halcyon days of hostile bids were
notorious.141 Those with long memories will recall the 1980s
debacle of Robert Campeau’s mash up of various retail chains
that resulted in a massive retail bankruptcy of Federated
Department Stores in the 1980s,142 a debacle that outstrips
Ackman’s failure. Nearly half of all major U.S. corporations
received a takeover bid in the 1980s.143 Many of those
corporations restructured to make themselves less attractive
targets.144
Goshen and Steel also assert that activists will more
casually, with less investigation, pursue activism campaigns
because the lower cost of activism (a seven-to-ten percent
position versus a one hundred percent bid) means that the
activist has a lower “hurdle rate.”145 That argument seems not
to consider how the two parties, activist versus raider, finance
their respective transactions. In the halcyon days of hostile
bids, raiders bought their five-to-ten percent toeholds,
presumably with cash (like the activists) and relied heavily on

Goshen & Steel, supra note 6 (manuscript at 2).
Michelle Celarier, Eddie Lampert Shattered Sears, Sullied His
Reputation, and Lost Billions of Dollars. Or Did He? INSTITUTIONAL INV.
(Dec.
3,
2018),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1c33fqdnhf21s/EddieLampert-Shattered-Sears-Sullied-His-Reputation-and-Lost-Billions-ofDollars-Or-Did-He [https://perma.cc/8GUL-4HRN].
141 See generally LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN
CORPORATE FINANCE (1991).
142 See Carol J. Loomis, The Biggest, Looniest Deal Ever, FORTUNE,
June 18, 1990, at 48, 49.
143 Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry
Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 199
(1996).
144 See id. at 199. The “hurdle rate” is “the rate of return [acquirers]
need to make a target worth their substantial investment.” Goshen and
Steel, supra note 6 (manuscript at 3).
145 See Goshen and Steel, supra note 6 (manuscript at 3–4).
139
140
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debt financing to pay for the remainder of the acquisition.146
The comparative required return-on-equity is a matter of
conjecture. It is certainly the case that successful activists
generate a portfolio of activist positions147 both in the moment
and over time, but that may result in successful activists
developing skill in assessing potential interventions.
In a sense, to compare the virtues of a disciplinary takeover
with a disciplinary activist intervention is a quibble. A
successful hostile bid typically requires a bid premium greater
than a friendly deal and may exceed fifty percent.148 That
degree of underperformance is vanishingly rare in today’s
environment of high-powered stock-based compensation and
the monitoring of hedge fund activists. Rather, the hostile bids
we observe now are generally about the acquirer wanting
access to resources held or developed by the target. Cadbury
had developed its emerging market candy distribution chain,
and Kraft Foods (2009) wanted that distribution channel for
its snack food products.149 Sanofi-Aventis (2010) highly prized
Genzyme’s biotechnology capacity and its orphan disease drug
research and development.150 Broadcom (2018) wanted to
build a semiconductor powerhouse that it envisioned through
146 See Daniel J. Morrissey, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers—Does
Anything Go?, 53 TENN. L. REV. 103, 114–115 (1985). This alone means that
hostile bids are a blunt instrument for managerial discipline. Among other
factors, many firms do not generate steady cash flows that would make a
heavily leveraged transaction feasible, much less wise.
147 LAZARD, supra note 130, at 8.
148 See B. Espen Eckbo, Bidder Strategies and Takeover Premiums: A
Review, 15 J. CORP. FIN. 149, 154, 155 tbl.3 (2009).
149 Dana Cimilluca, Ilan Brat & Julie Jargon, Cadbury Sour on Kraft
Bid,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
8,
2009,
12:01
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125230432582989903 (on file with the
Columbia Business Law Review).
150 Ben Hirschler & Toni Clarke, Analysis: Rare Diseases Lure Sanofi,
Other Big Drugmakers, REUTERS (Aug. 3, 2010, 11:13 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-genzyme-sanofi-diseases/analysis-rarediseases-lure-sanofi-other-big-drugmakers-idUKTRE6723R920100803
[https://perma.cc/QDY5-F5P7]; Michael J. de la Merced & Thomas Kaplan,
Sanofi Bid for Genzyme Turns Hostile, and No Sweeter, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4,
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/05/business/global/05drug.html
[https://perma.cc/JF2F-HZXA]
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a merger with Qualcomm.151 Strategic considerations drove
these hostile overtures; underperformance had nothing to do
with it.
The nerve of the Goshen and Steel argument is that
shareholders have been disserved by the rise of shareholder
activism—shareholders have settled for too many singles and
doubles.152 Even if it had been validated by the Williams case,
a “crisis pill” is a one-off side show because it focuses on
exigent circumstances rather than a pervasive influence in
the environment. Instead, the Goshen and Steel point is
effectively: for the sake of the shareholders, we need a broadgauge barrier to activism.153 I find it hard to credit that
general claim. As a group, shareholders over the past decade
have done just great. Spectacular new firms, accounting for a
large share of the increased market capitalization, have
flourished, even in this age of heightened activism. Indeed,
some of those firms have faced activist challenges themselves,
for example, Apple (Icahn),154 Netflix (Icahn),155 Microsoft
(ValueAct),156 and now perhaps Amazon (Third Point).157

151 Ed Hammond & Ian King, Mr. Tan Goes to Washington: The
Undoing of a Tech Mega-Deal, BLOOMBERG, (Mar. 15, 2018, 7:32 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-15/mr-tan-goes-towashington-the-undoing-of-a-117-billion-deal (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review).
152 See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
153 Id. at 51.
154 Maureen Farrell, Carl Icahn Presses Apple to Buy Back Its Stock . . .
Again,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Feb.
11,
2015,
3:36
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-MBB-33147 (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review).
155 David Benoit, Icahn Exits Stage Right on Golden Netflix Trade,
WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2015, 11:32 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BLMBB-38438 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
156 Maureen Farrell, P&G, Apple, Microsoft: Activists Go Big with
Small
Stakes,
WALL ST. J.
(Jan.
6,
2014,
9:25
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-MBB-13804 (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review).
157 Juliet Chung, Cara Lombardo & Dana Mattioli, Activist Investor
Daniel Loeb Sees Roughly $1 Trillion of Untapped Value in Amazon, WALL.
ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2022, 10:44 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-
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Moreover, we have developed governance strategies to protect
and nurture entrepreneurs with “idiosyncratic vision” ranging
from private market ownership to dual class common stock.
As per Gilson and Gordon, from a shareholder point of
view, the risk of management’s “hyperopia” is just as great as
the market’s “myopia.”158 Instead of shutting down an
accountability mechanism—for what this is what an antiactivist pill does—we propose a governance innovation, a
director model that would buttress the board’s capacity to
monitor and help the management team achieve success with
directors who are “thickly informed, well-resourced, and high
motivated.”159 An anti-activist pill is “cheap talk”; it carries no
useful information; it works by force of arms. By contrast,
bringing on an “empowered director” is costly for the CEO
(because of the threat to the CEO’s power) and thus the
support of such a director can credibly convey the superiority
of management’s strategy (vs. that of the activist) to the
company’s majoritarian owners.160 This is a better way for a
public corporation without a controlling entrepreneur or hero
CEO to pursue a strategy that the market may not yet
appreciate than the deformation of corporate governance.
If there is a “crisis” in corporate governance, it arises from
the social interests that the shareholder value model does not
easily address. One idea that might be described as the “Davos
investor-daniel-loeb-sees-roughly-1-trillion-of-untapped-value-in-amazon11645048496 (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review).
158 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Board 3.0: An
Introduction, 74 BUS. LAW. 351, 354, 363 (2019).
159 See id. at 353 (emphasis omitted).
Just because management says its long-term strategies are
first best but just not (yet) appreciated by the market doesn’t
make it so: the market may be myopic but management may
be hyperopic. Directors under the current board model are
generally not in position to evaluate and validate strategies
that the market does not already understand, and the
relevant parties, including the majoritarian institutional
owners, understand this.
Id. at 358. For an approach based on relational investing, see Alon Brav,
Dorothy Lund & Ed Rock, Validation Capital, 99 TEX. L. REV. 1247 (2021).
160 Id. at 353.
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consensus” is to invite managers and boards to balance the
interests of stakeholders, which puts these elites in charge of
various distributional decisions.161 Another strategy is to let
these concerns bubble up from the shareholders—shareholder
activism of a particular sort—in which board seats are the
values transmission mechanism. The ESG activism reflected
in the successful proxy contest waged by Engine No. 1 vis-àvis Exxon-Mobil is one such example.162 But there could be
many more opportunities as ESG funds are formed
specifically with a “voice” agenda rather than a “screening
agenda.” Moreover, some of the large asset managers are
moving to devolve voting authority to their investors.
BlackRock, for example, has reported that holders of nearly
40% of its $4.8 trillion in equity assets are now eligible to
select among different forms of devolved voting authority.163
The universal proxy card will lower proxy contest costs and
thus invite such contests by a broader group of
shareholders.164
As I argued at the beginning of this Article, Delaware
corporate law leaves plenty of room for firms to follow
strategies that are not “profit maximizing” in the Milton
Friedman sense and yet hold to the view that firms are
economically focused organizations.165 Director election
contests are a natural way for shareholders to channel their
beliefs into the operational decisions of the firm.
161 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance Versus Real
Governance 10 (Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 565, 2022),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4007324 (on file with
the Columbia Business Law Review).
162 See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
163 BLACKROCK, Working To Expand Proxy Voting Choice for Our
Clients
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/investmentstewardship/insights/expand-proxy-voting-choice
(Feb.
23,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/W7Q7-62CB].
164 See In Another Win for Shareholders, SEC Adopts New Rules for
Universal Proxy Cards in Contested Director Elections, WHITE & CASE LLP
(Nov. 21, 2024), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/another-winshareholders-sec-adopts-new-rules-universal-proxy-cards-contested
[https://perma.cc/K5LV-7FTH].
165 See infra Part II.
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Here is where the problems created by anti-activist pills
become particularly acute. Regardless of the pill trigger
threshold, expansions of “beneficial ownership” through
acting-in-concert provisions are likely to ensnare most ESG
activism. To achieve success, the ESG proxy contest initiator
will necessarily go on a persuasion campaign. As noted above,
a hostile bidder needs only the persuasive power of a premium
bid to win a proxy campaign coupled with a conditional tender
offer. The pill threshold may matter, because the toehold may
represent the bidder’s profit, but a capacious definition of
beneficial ownership does not. But for proxy contest initiators
who are attempting merely to “influence” the control of the
issuer but not to acquire the firm, persuasion on the merits
and the capacity to let shareholders (voters) know that others
are resonating to this persuasion seem essential. Who wants
to follow Don Quixote off a cliff? Yet “beneficial ownership”
provisions of most anti-activist pills will sweep in an ESG
crowd no less than the villainous “wolfpacks.”

VII. CONCLUSION
Shareholder voting is foundational to the legitimacy of
corporate power. Shareholder voice may also come to be one
way in which the corporation can successfully navigate the
multiple pressures of a complex world. Shareholder activism
is one channel through which the corporation comes to adapt
to the economic dynamism of the environment. It will
increasingly come to be a channel through which the
corporation adapts to the socio-political dynamism of the
environment as well. Anti-activist poison pills have no place
in these dynamics.

